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DIVORCE--STALEMATE

By

School of Law, 1939, Denver
University

ALFRED HEINICKE,

OR many years the Colorado legislature struggled to
make more certain the status of those who had taken
steps to receive divorces a vinculo matrimonii, and to
provide that the uncertain period between the first findings
and the final decree be not extended unreasonably, nor the
parties be suspended indefinitely between the married status
and the unmarried because of the whim of one of th~ parties.
Chapter 90, S. L. 1925, page 23 7, attempted to empower the court to issue a final decree upon application of the
guilty party to take care of that situation; for example, where
a wife had sued her husband for divorce a vinculo and findings
had been entered in her favor, entitling her to a decree at or
after six months, yet had not availed herself of that right.
The act sought to make status more definite by allowing the
husband to ask that the wife be given her final decree. 1
Chapter 91, page 327, of the Session Laws of 1929, was
an effort to make the findings of fact and the conclusions of
law entered on a petition for divorce operate as a decree of
divorce after six months from entry thereof, if within that
period nothing was done to set aside the findings. 1
Finally by the 1933 Session Laws. page 440, the legislature provided for interlocutory decrees of divorce and gave
such interlocutory decrees the full sanction accorded to judg-

F

''25 act and '29 act discussed in Cartier v. Cartier, 88 Colo. 76; see also Laizure
v. Baker, 91 Colo. 292. and cases in note 2.
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ments, the mere lapse of time to make them final without any
further action of the court. 2
The 193 3 act went further to declare it Colorado's public
policy that rights be rendered certain and that public welfare
demanded that divorce actions be finally determined within a
reasonable time after the trial, 3 i. e. that parties to a divorce
action be not overlong neither finally divorced nor truly married.
Yet the same legislature embedded in our statutory law
that anomalous divorce known as divorce a mensa et thoro,
or limited divorce. 4 A divorce which throws the 'parties to it
back on society in the undefined and dangerous character of a
wife without a husband and a husband without a wife, and
in the words of Vernier, has as its primary effect a destruction
of the right of cohabitation, and as its chief characteristic that
it does not destroy the marriage. 5
"Thus it leaves the parties in the position of unmarried persons, in
relation to each other, deprived of the pleasures and freed from the duties
incident upon cohabitation. Yet, as to the rest of the world, they are
still married * * * requiring a degree of chastity scarcely to be expected in an ordinary mortal, for it leaves neither party free to marry
again and is no defense to a criminal charge, either of bigamy or adultery. " 5
"This proceeding is, while destitute of justice, one of the most corrupting devices ever imposed by serious .natures on blindness and credulity. It was tolerated only because men believed as a part of their
religion, that dissolution would be an offense against God; whence the
slope was easy toward any compromise with good sense; and as the fruit
of compromise we have this ill begotten monster of divorce amensa et
thoro, made up of pious doctrine and worldly stupidity. In almost
every place where marriage is known, this folly walks with her-the
queen and the slut, the pure and the foul, the bright and the dark, dwell
together. " 6

The Colorado Ace gives the right to maintain an action
for divorce a mensa et thoro to the wife, upon any ground
"For holdings based on this statute see Kastner v. Kastner, 55 P. (2d) 947, and
Morris v. Probst, 55 P. (2d) 944 (also discusses 1925 and '29 provisions).
'Morris v. Probst, supra.
•session Laws 1933, chapter 72; C. S. A. chapter 56, sections 25-32.
•vernier, American Family Laws, Vol. II, page 341.
•Joel Prentus Bishop, New Commentaries on Marriage, Divorce and Separation,
Vol. I. sec. 68, quoted in Vernier, supra, sec. 114.
'C. S. A. chapter 56, sections 25-32. It is perhaps trivial to note that the act
placing this divorce (among other things) in our statutes was declared so necessary for
immediate preservation of public peace, health and safety that an emergency existed and
that a "safety clause" was attached to make it immediately effective.
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provided by law for divorce or where the wife has been abandoned by the husband without just cause or excuse, and a reconciliation is not probable and it would be just or proper to
grant such relief and upon any ground generally recognized in
equity.
What is the justification for this divorce in Colorado,
where reconciliation is promoted by the use of interlocutory
decrees, where the other advantages of such divorce may be had
under a decree of absolute divorce without the injustice of a
limited divorce? If the act is based on religious feelings against
divorce a vinculo, why is the right given only to wives, or is it
that wives are more religious in Colorado?
Suppose a case where a husband and wife are incompatible: Certainly no one longer believes that in divorces the guilt
is all on one side and virtue all on the other (although Colo~
rado still holds that if both parties are guilty they shall remain
in holy deadlock) .8 But suppose an "innocent" wife obtains
a limited divorce from her "guilty" husband and has received
what property9 she wishes and custody of the children. She
may be fairly content with her life and also determined that
her husband shall remain a husband, yet not a husband. Why
otherwise the limited divorce?
While the act of '33 does provide that the decree of sepa~
ration a mensa et thoro shall not bar either of the parties from
subsequently bringing and maintaining an action for divorce,
and the wife could, if she wished, obtain an absolute divorce
on the same grounds that she obtained her limited divorce,
assuming the original grounds were sufficient for absolute divorce, what can the "guilty" husband do? He has no grounds
that existed before his wife's decree (having been declared the
guilty party). Certainly his grounds must arise after her
decree, and perhaps his wife is careful to see that he has no
grounds; she may even lead a chaste and proper life. She is in
the position of a wife, yet under no personal duties to her
husband, a wife who may live apart from her husband and yet
not be guilty of desertion, although her repentant husband
may ask her to come back. 10
"C. S. A. chapter 56, section 7.
•see C. S. A. chapter 56, section 28.
'"Williams v. Williams (an Arizona case), 265 P. 87, 61 A. L. R. 126-4.
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The husband is denied the freedom from the bonds of
matrimony while he is cut off from association with his wife
and children and exposed to their indifference and perhaps
hatred. The wrong done him is not a legal one for which the
law affords redress, for presumptively his own wrongful conduct brought about his altered status. 10 Nor may he seek a
more congenial companion for another attempt at being a good
husband. 11
In all fairness it is difficult to see why these sociologically
unhealthy situations should be allowed to arise in Colorado
and to be fostered by our statutes, when Colorado has been
progressive enough to abolish action for breach of promise,
alienation of affections, and civil actions for seduction.
It is true that Colorado, by the decisions of its courts,
has long allowed an action for separate maintenance or alimony without divorce, 12 but it is to be questioned whether
the action is entitled to the further sanction of a statute. It is
"An interesting point is also raised by S. L. '33, chapter 72, section 6; C. S. A.
chapter 56, section 30. providing, as to separate maintenance decrees, that such a decree
granted in this state shall not be defeated or affected, or barred in any way, by any
decree of divorce obtained by one of the parties in some other state or country, if no
personal service within such state or country was had upon the party adversely affected
by such decree of divorce, and if such party did not presonally appear in such action:
and such decree of divorce so obtained shall not be used as a bar or estoppel to, or be
admitted in evidence in any proceeding to enforce, or concerning, affecting, or involving
in any way such decree of separate maintenance. Evidently a wife who has received a
Colorado separate maintenance decree may, if it so please her, later obtain a divorce in
another state, yet, under certain conditions, still sue in Colorado on the separate maintenance decree without fear of her husband submitting her foreign divorce decree by
way of estoppel or bar.
"See Daniels v. Daniels, 9 Colo. 133, 10 P. 657, a Supreme Court case holding
alimony to be within the jurisdiction of courts of equity independently of statute and
to be a relief which might be granted although no divorce was prayed: Hanscom v.
Hanscom (1895), 6 C. A. 97, 39 P. 885, saying a court of equity independent of
statute has jurisdiction to award alimony, even when no divorce is sought: Dye v. Dye
(1897), 9 C. A. 320, 48 P. 313, holding a wife may maintain a suit in equity to compel payment of alimony where separate maintenance is the only relief prayed, and that
the power in equity to entertain such a suit by a wife is not affected by S. L. 1893,
making neglect of a wife a misdemeanor and providing punishment therefor: In re
Popejoy (1899), 26 Colo. 32, 77 Am. St. Rep. 222, 55 P. 1083, holding it settled
by the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals that an action
for separate maintenance may be maintained and that the wife, in a proper case, is entitled
to a judgment for separate maintenance though she does not seek or wish a legal separation a vinculo: Austin v. Austin (1908), 42 Colo. 130, 94 P. 309, cited in notes 38
L. R. A. (NS) 594, Ann. Cases 1912A 938, Ann. Cases 1916A 857, 6 A. L. R. 70,
81, 40 A. L. R. 1240, holding a district court has jurisdiction of a suit by a wife for
separate maintenance independently of a divorce action or of a criminal proceeding for
the husband's failure to provide reasonable support: Fahey v. Fahey, 43 Colo. 354.
96 P. 251. 127 Am. St. Rep. 118, 18 L. R. A. (NS) 1147, holding it is settled in
this state that a wife may maintain an action against her husband for separate maintenance indepmdent of an action for divorce.
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submitted that rather than perpetuate the right, it would be
better to eliminate it.
The first mention of the action that I have been able to
find in the Colorado statutes is in the rather indefinite provisions in the general divorce statute of 1917, 13 amended in part
in 192 7, 14 unrepealed by the 193 3 statute and still existing in
our law. This seems merely a lefthanded and perhaps unconscious recognition of the action as existing and affects only
procedural matter therein. 11:.
There is a difference, of course, between divorce a mensa
et thoro and separate maintenance, but to my mind it has become almost indistinct, certainly the decisions are confused.
Ballentine's College Law Dictionary defines divorce a mensa
et thoro as "a divorce which operated as a mere temporary separation, leaving all the other marital rights and obligations in
full force during the life of the parties and being subject to the
complete restoration of the marital status by reconciliation.
In the ecclesiastical courts proceedings for such a divorce
sought a separation for causes arising after the marriage and
admitted the validity of the marriage;" and separate maintenance as "the condition or status of a married woman who is
18
S. L. I9I7, chapter 65, section 2, paragraph 3 (Compiled Laws '21. section
5594; C. S. A .. chapter 56, section 3). In any action for separate maintenance the
answer of the defendant shall contain: I. A general or specific denial of each material
allegation in the complaint intended to be controverted by the defendant. 2. A statement of any new matter constituting a defense or constituting an action for divorce, in
ordinary and concise language, without unnecessary repetition. The section also deals
with jurisdiction as to divorce and separate maintenance.
S. L. I917, chapter 65, section 6. (C. L. sec. 5598; C. S. A. chapter 56, sec. 7.)
In any action for divorce the defendant may file a cross complaint in which may be set
forth any one or more causes for divorce or separate maintenance against the plaintiff;
and if upon the trial of such action, both parties shall be found guilty of any one or
more of the causes of divorce, then a divorce shall not be granted to either of said parties.
14
S. L. 1927, chapter 93, sec. 2 (C. S. A. chapter 56, sec. 3). entitled "an act
amending 5594, concerning divorce and alimony," provides that the district court shall
have jurisdiction of all actions for separate maintenance and the county court of such
actions for separate maintenance where the complaint avers that the plaintiff does not
ask or seek alimony in excess of $2,000. (This provision also repeated in section 3.
S. L. '33, chap. 72, C. S. A. chap. 56, sec. 27).
"In any action for divorce and alimony or for separate maintenance, the answer
of the defendant shall contain: I. A general or specific denial of each material allegation
in the complaint intended to be controverted by the defendant. 2. A statement of any
new matter if any is relied on constituting a defense or constituting an action for divorce
or separate maintenance in ordinary and concise language without unnecessary repetition.
"Except as in C. S. A. chapter 56, sec. 7, supra, which provides that if both parties
are guilty there is to be no divorce. Possibly in such case there can be a decree of separate
maintenance if asked for in the cross complaint.
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living apart from her husband and is being supported by him,
but without being divorced from him."
Perhaps the best discussion of the difference between the
two is found in an Arizona case of Williams v. Williams, 16 in
which the court says a husband may sue his wife for absolute
divorce on the grounds of desertion after she has obtained a
decree of separate maintenance from him and the husband has
in good faith attempted a reconciliation which she has refused
and continues to refuse, 17 but he cannot do this if she has obtained a divorce a mensa et thoro.
"The action for separate maintenance and the action for divorce
mensa et thoro are not the same, as the former has for its object the
compelling of a husband who has wilfully deserted or abandoned his
wife or who has committed acts that would give cause for an action for
a.n absolute divorce to provide support for his wife and children. The
judgment does not expressly authorize the wife to live separately and
apart from her husband. That is probably what happens, but, if so, it
is not under the sanction of a court decree, whereas under a decree of
separation from bed and board the refusal of the wife to cohabit with
the husband is so sanctioned and authorized." 18

It is not known whether the Colorado courts would
make this distinction. A reading of the cases leads me to believe that they have seen no difference between the two actions
or that such distinction was never called to their attention. 19
Certainly the Colorado legislature saw no distinction/9A
for the '33 statute, 20 "An act relating to marriage and divorce," reads: Section 1. "An action for separate maintenance (divorce from bed and board) [sic] may be maintained
by a wife."
18
Williams v. Williams. 265 P. 87. 61 A. L. R. 1264.
"Appleton v. Appleton, 97 Wash. 199, 166 Pac. 61.
18
Williams v. Williams, supra.
'"Although the point was not really raised in Austin v. Austin, 42 Colo. 130, the
language of the court there seems to imply that such distinction does not exist. There
the court finds that a decree of separate maintenance "is not objectionable as leaving the
question of reconciliation entirely in the wife's hands." (Objection was not made below.) From which it follows that a wife could live apart from her husband as long
as she wished, even though be desired a reconciliation, without being guilty of desertion.
In re Popejoy 26 Colo. 32. says a wife may seek alimony "even though she does
not wish separation from the bonds of matrimony." (a vinculo) A statement that could
have been made were the court distinguishing divorce from bed and board from a divorce
from the bonds of matrimony. See also the cases cited in note 12.
19AAn additional factor to support this contention is that the action for separate
maintenance when previously mentioned has always been as part of a divorce statute
with no separate mention in title.
"'S. L. '33 chap. 72, C. S. A. chap. 56, sections 25-32.
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It seems quite possible that the 1933 statute, as it relates
to separate maintenance, 21 merely sets out the judge~made law
of Colorado. But it is submitted that this is not wise or for~
ward~ looking legislation. It places in our statutory law some~
thing that might better be forgotten.
If we must have such a divorce, the law should provide
for a merger of the decree after a certain time into one of abso~
lute divorce in case there is no reconciliation. The promotion
of reconciliation seems to be the only sensible basis for limited
divorce 22 and this can just as easily be obtained under an inter~
locutory decree of divorce a vinculo. 23 But we do not need
such a divorce, and Colorado would be stepping forward if she
abolished it.
nThe statute also provides that the courts shall have power to specifically enforce
marriage settlement and separate maintenance agreements whether the parties thereto are
divorced or not. Many husbands and wives will separate no matter what the law.
Therefore as a matter of practical policy it seems proper to give legal sanction to fair
agreements relating to support and property rights.
"But Colorado law, C. S. A. chap. 56, sec. 25 (b)-a wife may maintain the
action if she has been abandoned "and a reconciliation is not probable."
"This may well be the basis of West Virginia's action in repealing its statute allowing limited divorce ( 1931). West Virginia bad before that time allowed such merger.
Louisiana provides (see Vernier, supra. p. 422, and 1938 supplement p. 76)
that where there has been no reconciliation after the expiration of one year from the
obtaining of the decree of limited divorce, the successful party may apply for an absolute
divorce. The party against whom the limited divorce was obtained may apply for an
absolute divorce after one year and sixty days from the obtaining of the decree of limited
divorce. But in Louisiana a limited divorce is a necessary prelude to an absolute divorce
and is really in the nature of an interlocutory decree. Since Colorado has such: it is
submitted that there is no need here for a limited divorce, even though made just and
fair as in Louisiana.

THE COLORADO VIEW ON ALTERATION OF
TESTAMENTARY INSTRUMENTS
By MARVIN L. BROWN and EUGENE SCHAETZEL, School of
Law, 19 39, Denver University

T

HIS discussion will be limited to a consideration of the
legal effect of alterations made in a will after its execution
by the testator, in the absence of a re~execution in statutory manner. · For the purpose of discussion there shall be
presumed previous proof that any change was made by the
testator, himself, and not by some other person. Obviously,
there is no concern over alteration of an holographic will, but
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only over alteration of a testamentary instrument where there
has clearly been no compliance with statutory requirements.
Testamentary alterations of this nature are not such as are
intended to work a revocation of the whole instrument, but
are only those intended to work a change as to one or more
parts of the instrument, leaving the remainder as originally
executed.
Such alteration seems to give rise to four possible effects
in law: ( 1) the alteration might act as a total revocation of
the instrument: ( 2) the alteration might act as a partial revocation of so much of the instrument as is affected; ( 3) the
alteration might be ignored and the instrument admitted to
probate in its original form; ( 4) the will might be given effect
as altered. No attempt will be made here to exhaust and
explain the authorities on this subject as there is a complete
survey of the field in 62 A. L. R. 13 76 and 115 A. L. R. 715.
Instead, there is given here a mere summary of the general
rules pointed out by the cases, and an attempt to determine
from them which of these rules Colorado should adopt in the
various situations.
Before it is possible to determine whether an alteration
may operate as a total or partial revocation, the possibility of
revocation pro-tanto must be determined. If revocation protanto is possible an alteration may have the effect of revoking
part of a will even though the ultimate purpose of the testator
in giving effect to the will as altered is not accomplished. The
possibility of revocation pro-tanto depends upon the particular statute of the jurisdiction. Colorado's statute concerning
the revocation of wills states: "No will shall be revoked otherwise than by," etc./ unlike statutes commonly found elsewhere which begin "No will or any part thereof shall be revoked otherwise than by." It has been almost uniformly held
as to statutes such as that in Colorado that revocation protanto will not be permitted, since by omitting reference to
a part of the will the legislature has indicated an intent that
there can be no valid revocation of such a part.
Where the statute does impliedly authorize a revocation
pro-tanto by words included therein, it differs distinctly from
an act such as Colorado's and should have no authoritative
'1935 C. S. A .. Ch. 176, Sec. 40.
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effect in the construction of our act. On the other hand, the
very fact that Colorado adopted her act in view of a majority
holding that such an act would not admit of partial revocation
would seem to preclude all arguments to the contrary. Under
either type of statute the doctrine of dependent relative revocation may apply in this situation. Under this doctrine, if
the cancellation were relative and dependent upon the efficacy
of the substituted portion, then, since the substituted portion
cannot be given effect because of the failure to comply with the
wills act, the will is reestablished as originally executed, as it
is presumed that the testator did not intend to cancel the deleted portion in any event but only upon the condition that
the substituted portion be given effect. The same result is
reached under a statute such as that in Colorado without the
application of the doctrine since it is here impossible to make
a partial revocation in any circumstances except perhaps where
the original contents are incapable of proof. Under circumstances where there is shown to be an absolute intent to revoke
a part of the will in spite of a failure of the interlined portion,
then states with the type of statute differing from that in
Colorado will disregard dependent relative revocation and
allow the revocation pro-tanto; here the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation has no application.
Interlineations may be of many different types, but of
whatever type they are generally disregarded. Where they
would operate as dispositive provisions they are everywhere
void for non-conformity with the wills act. In such cases,
the fourth possibility of solution above suggested is never
employed. Where the alterations are merely inserted to explain and clarify parts of the original will and are therefore
not intended to affect the substance of any gift, they may
either be disregarded or recognized to be without force in
probate.
Of course, there is a possibility of revocation pro-tanto
by operation of law, wherein the impelling force arises independently of the testator's act. Fraud or undue influence
upon the testator by one of the beneficiaries may operate to
revoke the will in part, but the other beneficiaries should not
be forced to suffer by this wrong so the remainder of the will
should be probated as it stands. This result will be reached
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by a court under either type of revocatory statute since the
court will prevent the fraud without regard to the testator's
ability to revoke his will. Although the statute does not
recognize this latter type of revocation pro-tanto, the court
will accomplish its end by use of other powers. Colorado
courts have worked such a partial revocation several times and
have indicated an intention to follow the above-stated rule. 2
Now, with the benefit of the foregoing analysis of possibilities of revocation pro-tanto, let us undertake the task of
determining how Colorado's courts would rule upon the differe.11 t propositions previous} y set forth:
( 1) Although Colorado cases on all points akin to the
revocation of wills are meager, we may assume that an attempted partial revocation will not work to void the will
completely unless the revoked portion is such a material part
of the will as to imply an intent to revoke the whole. The
early case of Glass v. Scott, 14 Colo. App. 377, 60 P. 186
( 1900), recognized that the mere drawing of a line through
the testator's signature would revoke the will. In like manner any cancellation of other material parts of a will should
operate similarly if it showed a revocation by obliteration
combined with an intention to revoke the whole. Where cancelling and interlining is carried to such an extent as to amount
to a complete revision of the will, then it would seem that the
testator has intended that his original will should be revoked
in original form and the court, recognizing this obvious intent,
should declare the will void as an obliteration within the
statute. Partial cancellation should have no similar effect
even though the full intent of the testator cannot be carried
out, since the leaving of the major portions of the will untouched indicates that the testator wanted the original will
to stand in force.
( 2) Partial revocation will be effected by operation of
law to prevent fraud, but it cannot be accomplished by the
voluntary act of the testator except by impossibility of proof
of the original context. Practically, it is possible that the
testator could so completely obliterate a small portion of his
'Snodgrass v. Smith, 42 Colo. 60, 94 P. 312; Ireland v. Hudson, 92 Colo. ll 0,
18 P. (2d) 311; Frazier v. Frazier, 83 Colo. 188, 263 P. 413; Jeffreys v. Trust Co ..
97 Colo. 188, 48 P. (2d) 1019.
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will as by erasure or cutting that it would be impossible to
determine the content of the deleted portions. Under such
circumstances we might expect the court to be very strict in
determining whether or not an intention was indicated to
revoke the whole by cancellation of a material portion. However, if it is determined that the portion is not essential there
is no reason why the instrument should not be accepted for
probate with allowance that the deleted portion might be later
inserted by acceptable proof of its contents if this proves possible. It is immaterial here that there be interlineations in
conjunction with the attempted partial revocation, since they
cannot be of force and the partial revocations will not be recognized if susceptible of proof. If the context of the partial
revocation is not susceptible of proof, then the will should
simply be admitted to probate with any interlineations omitted and with the deleted portions blank. The note in 62
A. L. R. above quoted on page 114, collects the authorities
supporting this view. Hence in this single situation there is
a possibility of revocation pro-tanto in Colorado arising
through inability to prove the contents of the deleted portion.
This is the most desirable result though apparently not authorized by statute.
As a result then, partial revocation in Colorado will fail
to take effect and the will can be probated in the form in which
originally executed, or with blanks. This seems to be a very
logical result in view of Colorado's narrow statute, since it
will prevent the imposition of frauds upon the court. If partial revocation were allowed in spite of the seeming statutory
intent as it exists, we might expect evildoers oftentimes to
attempt to change the will between the time of finding and
the time of delivery to the court.
(3) We have seen above that partial cancellation and
attempted change will not act either completely or partially
to void the will except in the one situation of inability to
prove the contents of the deleted portion. Logically, therefore, we come upon the rule which should be applied in ordinary circumstances. The will, not intended to be completely
revoked and not capable of being probated as partially revoked where the contents can be proved, should be probated
as originally executed disregarding all attempted cancellations
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and interlineations. Apparently, most will changes are of
the nature wherein there is a partial cancellation combined
with an interlineation, but as yet the Supreme Court of Colorado has never been called upon to rule as to the effect of this.
It has been stated by our court that revocation cannot be
effected (by "the testator's act) except in the manner provided
for in the statute. 3 A recent case in the trial court completely
sustains the view here taken.~
( 4) The previous discussion is sufficient to show that
there is no support for a view that Colorado would give effect
to the will as altered except in the situation where the alteration
consists solely of an obliteration and it is impossible to prove
the contents of the obliterated portion. In that situation the
will should be admitted to probate with the obliterated portions blank, and hence the will is given effect as altered. In
all other situations this could not be accomplished.
"Twilley v. Durkee, 72 Colo. 444 at 462, 211 P. 668.
'In re Jones, Estate No. 60817, County Court of City and County of Denver.

THE TAXPAYER'S DAMNUM: ABSQUE INJURIA
By LOIS GESSFORD CLARK, School of Law, 1939,
Denver University

HE taxpayer, now deceased, who hailed the case of The
Farmers Loan and Trust Company, Executors v. Minnesota1 of 1930, the cases following it, and the Federal Interpleader Act2 of 193 6, as the solution to the oppressive burden of paying two state inheritance taxes on his
intangibles, is stirring uneasily in his grave; and the taxpayer
who has survived the tax burden thus far, is shaking perceptibly in his shoes, and is wondering just what the Supreme
Court of the United States did mean in The Farmers Loan and
Trust Company case when it said, "We have determined that
in general intangibles may be properly taxed at the domicile
of their owner, and we can find no sufficient reason for saying
that they are not entitled to enjoy an immunity against tax'280 u. s. 204.
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ation at more than one place similar to that accorded to intangibles.''
The case expressly overruled Blackstone v. Miller, 3
which held that the testamentary transfer of intangibles was
taxable both at the debtor's and at the creditor's domicile
without violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
pointed out that the case· of Coe v. Errol/ though cited
to support the proposition, does not say that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not prohibit double taxation. That The
Farmers Loan and Trust Company case does stand for the
proposition that the double taxation there was unconstitutional is made clear by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Stone who points out that although he is in agreement with
the holding of the case, it is not on the grounds that double
taxation is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
same proposition was repeated by the court in Baldwin v.
Missouri5 and the First National Bank of Boston v. Maine6
when it said, "Due regard for the processes of correct thinking compels the conclusion that a determination fixing the
local situs of a. thing for the purpose of transferring it in
one state, carries with itan implicit denial that there is a local
situs in another state for the purpose of transferring the same
thing there * * * that shares of stock, like other intangibles, constitutionally can be subjected to a death transfer
tax by one state only."
It should be noticed that in these three cases, The Farmers
Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota, Baldwin v. Missouri, and First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, the
court was refusing to allow the transfer at death of an
intangible to be taxed by two states on inconsistent theories.
The theory of the state of the debtor's domicile was that it
could tax the succession to the intangibles since the chose in
action was created and existed by virtue of its laws; the theory
of the state of the decedent's domicile was that under the old
rule of mobilia sequuntur personam, the domicile governs the
transfer and succession at death to an intangible and so it could
tax that succession. It seems almost elementary, therefore,
1
188U.S.l89.
•116U.S.517.
"281 u.s. 586.
"284 u.s. 312.
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that if it is unconstitutional double taxation for two states
to tax the transfer of intangibles, basing their power on two
inconsistent and different theories, it is even more clearly a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for two states to tax
the same transfer of intangibles on the same theory, that is, on
the theory that each state is the domicile of the decedent.
We have it from eminent authorities7 that every person
has at all times one and only one domicile, and yet in spite of
this rule and in spite of the pronouncement of the court as to
the unconstitutionality of double taxation of intangibles by
states in The Farmers Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota and similar cases, in the case of Dorrance et al. v. Martins
the Supreme Court of the United States refused to grant
certiorari even though both New Jersey and Pennsylvania
had decided it was the decedent's domicile and had proceeded
to collect a tax on the succession to the decedent's intangibles. This refusal to grant certiorari, although it settled the
case, did not give as clear cut a decision on the issue as could
be hoped for and the taxpayer continued to hope that the
Supreme Court meant what it said in The Farmers Loan and
Trust Company case about the unconstitutionality of double
taxation. The question of domicile, of course, is a question
of jurisdiction, and may be inquired into by other states when
the question is properly raised there. This is not precluded
by the full faith and credit clause, since if the court has no
jurisdiction, it cannot render a valid judgment or decree which
must be recognized in sister states. Therefore, even if state A
decides the decedent is domiciled there, state B may also decide
that the decedent is domiciled in state B, and both states claim
the power to collect an inheritance tax on the intangibles of
the decedent; and in a more rare situation both states may
decide that the decedent was not a domiciliary, and he will
slumber on peacefully in his grave taxed by neither state.
The taxpayer, after The Farmers Loan and Trust Company case had raised his hopes and the Dorrance case had
dulled them, discovered in the Federal Interpleader Act of
19369 what he thought was his salvation from the anomaly
of two states or forty-eight deciding that he was domiciled
'Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Sec. 10.

•z9s u. s. 678.
·
•zs U. S. C. A.. para. 41 (26).

DICTA

121

there. This act seemed to provide a procedure which was so
perfectly suited to his case that he dared to predict that the
Supreme Court would remember what it had said in The
Farmers Loan and Trust Company case and uphold his constitutional right to be free from double taxation by states and
the right of his personal representative to bring suit under
the act.
Briefly, the act which was reall" "'rt amendment to section 24 of the Judicial Code, provides that the United States
District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of bills of interpleader and bills in the nature of interpleader, filed by any
person, firm, or corporation having in his possession money
or property of the value of five hundred dollars or more which
two or more adverse claimants, citizens of different states are
claiming. The Complainant, the one who files the bill, is
required to deposit the money or property in the registry of
the court or give bond for it; and the bill expressly declares
that such a suit may be brought even though the titles or claims
of the adverse claimants do not have a common origin, are not
identical, but adverse and independent of each other. The
suit may be brought in the district court of the district in
which one of the claimants resides and the district court has
the power to issue process for all claimants, and to issue injunctions restraining the claimants from instituting or prosecuting any suit concerning the claim in a state or federal court.
Since this act seemed to cover precisely the case of tax officials
of two states claiming an inheritance tax on intangibles on the
basis of domicile of the decedent, in 1936 the suit of Worcester
County Trust Company v. Long 10 was brought in the District Court for the district of Massachusetts by a Massachusetts executor and citizen. On June 26, 1935, the will of
Robert H. Hunt had been admitted to probate in Massachusetts and the complainant was appointed executor. At his
death, Mr. Hunt owned a bank deposit and other intangibles
in Massachusetts and a. bank deposit in California. On July
29, 1935, the Security First National Bank of Los Angeles
was appointed administrator with will annexed in ancillary
proceedings in the Superior Court of California. Tax officials of both Massachusetts and California asserted that Mr.
'

0

14 Fed. Supp. 754.
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Hunt was domiciled there and each claimed a considerable sum
as inheritance taxes on his intangibles. On the grounds that
this was a denial of due process, a denial of equal protection
of the law, and that there was an adequate remedy at law, the
Massachusetts executor filed suit under the Interpleader Act
of 193 6, interpleading the tax officials of Massachusetts and
California. From a practical standpoint the executor was in
difficulty since prolonged litigation would cause the estate
great expense, prevent distribution immediately, and compel
the executor to keep large cash reserves on hand at little or no
interest to pay the taxes. The complainant asked that the
court grant him a temporary injunction against the tax officials and decide the domicile of Mr. Hunt so that the tax could
be paid. The District Court granted a temporary injunction
and the taxpayer's hope of a solution to his problem seemed
about to be realized.
His hopes, however, were short-lived for on March 15,
193 7, the Circuit Court of Appeals 11 for the First Circuit reversed the decree granting the injunction; and on December 6,
193 7, the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari12 leaving the taxpayer back in his dilemma. He must
pay two state inheritance taxes on his intangibles in spite of
the fact that among the words of the court refusing certiorari
appeared the following: "This court has held states statutes
construed to impose death taxes upon the intangibles of decedents domiciled elsewhere infringe the Fourteenth Amendment, and it has accordingly reversed judgments of state courts
enforcing such liability." The court thereupon cites the case
of the Farmers Loan and Trust Company v. Minnesota and
the First National Bank v. Maine.
The court based its refusal of certiorari on the following
propositions:
1. This is a suit against a state and violates the Eleventh Amendment.
2. The petitioners do not assert that the tax laws of
Massachusetts and California include the taxation on death
of the intangibles of those domiciled in other states, or that
11
12

89 Fed. 2nd 59.
302 u. s. 292.
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the courts of those states have ever held that their laws should
be thus applied.
3. No constitutional provision requires uniformity of
judicial decision by state courts.
As to the first of these propositions, that is, that such a
suit violates the Eleventh Amendment, the case of ex parte
Young13 settled that question. ·A suit against an officer of a
state is not necessarily a suit against a state. If an officer is acting unconstitutionally or illegally, even though under the authority of a state statute, he is not the state for the purpose of
such action and may be enjoined. In the case of tax officials
being sued to prevent double taxation of the intangibles of the
decedent, the tax official of one state must be acting unconstitutionally and illegally, since a person is domiciled in only one
state at a time. Therefore a suit to enjoin the tax official from
collecting a tax unconstitutionally is not a suit against a state.
As to the second proposition, that the complainant does
not point to any state law or judicial decision of California or
Massachusetts which holds that the intangibles of a decedent
may be taxed in a state where he is not domiciled, the answer
is that due process applies to substance as well as form; and
that although a law may be constitutional on its face, and the·
necessary notice and opportunity to be heard is given, nevertheless in its application the law may be unconstitutional. 14
As to the third contention, that no constitutional provision requires uniformity of judicial decision, this is a generality which begs the question. The complainant asserts that
one of the states in question is acting unconstitutionally in
demanding the inheritance tax on intangibles, since the Supreme Court of the United States has held that double taxation of intangibles violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is interesting to note that the answers of the complainant to the objections to bringing the suit were so highly regarded by Mr. Long, Tax Commissioner of Massachusetts
and a claimant under the bill of interpleader, that he made no
objection to the bill on jurisdictional grounds and approved
the practice of bringing suit under the Federal Interpleader Act
as a method of settling a question of disputed domicile. It is
"209 u.s. 123.
"Yick'Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356.
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interesting to note also that Mr. Justice Stone, who wrote a
concurring opinion in the Farmers Loan and Trust Company
case, spoke for the court in the Worcester County Trust Company case. In the former case Ivlr. Justice Stone pointed out
that he did not concur in the proposition that double taxation
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, but that he believed the
transfer of intangibles on death should be taxed at the domicile
of the decedent and not the domicile of the debtor, since the
tax is an excise or privilege tax on the transfer of an intangible,
which transfer or privilege is enjoyed in the state of the domicile of the decedent. Even if these narrow grounds for the
decision were accepted, this does not explain away the rules
that one has only one domicile at a time, and that the domicile
only can impose a transfer tax at death on intangibles; and
when two states collect such a tax on the basis of domicile,
certainly the taxpayer is being deprived of his property without due process of law.
It is thought by some that the taxpayer has a ray of hope
in the case of Texas v. Florida, et al., 15 now in the Supreme
Court of the United States.* Texas filed an original complaint
in the Supreme Court against Florida, Massachusetts and New
York to determine the domicile of Colonel Edward Green,
who died possessed of a forty-four million dollar estate. Because of its indeterminate state, it is difficult to make a prediction as to the real effect of the case; but since the Supreme
Court took jurisdiction because this was a suit between states
and not because a federal question as to double taxation might
be involved, and sirtce Texas brought the suit to protect its
own interests and not those of a taxpayer, it may well be that
the most the case shows is a willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to cooperate to determine the true domicile of a
decedent.
At the present time, therefore, the taxpayer will be protected against double taxation on his intangibles at the domicile of the debtor, which is not the domicile of the taxpayer,
since the court has said this is double taxation and a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment; but his is a hollow victory
indeed, when two states or forty-eight decide he is domiciled
there and assess an inheritance tax against his intangibles. He
'"301 U.S. 671; 302 U.S. 662.
* (Decided in favor of Massachusetts.)
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might just as well be philosophical and sigh, "Logic and taxation are not always the best of friends." 16
"From the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds in Sonneborn Brothers
v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506.

FROM THE FLOOR OF HELL TO THE CEILING OF
HEAVEN
By HELEN THORP, School of Law, 1939, Denver University
HE law, it is said, is in a constant state of flux. In no
field is this statement more apposite than in the field pertaining to aeronautics. The development of aircraft law
presents one of the best examples of the adaptation (and, according to some authorities, the overthrow) of ancient and
well settled legal principles to present-day needs.
The root of the trouble as far as aviation law is concerned arose in the early part of the fourteenth century when
(as has been asserted) 1 Cina da Pistoia offered his celebrated
maxim, ''cujus estsolum ejus est usque ad coelum.'' In forming
his rule of law, Signor da Pistoia gav:e little thought to Icarus'
abortive attempt to conquer the air, and the courts in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were totally unconcerned with
the designs for flying machines then· being drawn by Cesare
Borgia; s protege, Leonardo da Vinci. The maxim sounds so
neat, so all-inclusive. The courts through the centuries happily announced it and embedded it in the law.
The advent of the airplane as a practical thing presented
no small problem. Its importance in modern commercial and
economical life was not underestimated by the courts. But
freedom of flight across the country could not be reconciled
with the old maxim.
Several theories were advanced by the courts and the
writers to solve the dilemma. In general they were the theories
of privilege, of zones of use-as of expected use-and of nuisance. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss or analyze
these theories in any great detail.
The nuisance theory has its basis in the idea that there is
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no trespass unless to physical land, but the owner of the land
may have redress when the flight of aircraft over his property
constitutes a nuisance. 2
In preference to that theory some courts of the United
States have followed the theory of zone of expected use. Here
the courts say that the owner of the soil owns so much of the
column of air above as he may reasonably expect to use, but
above that point the air may be used by anyone unless and
until his acts constitute a nuisance. 3
Neither of the above-mentioned theories has received as
much support in this country as has the privilege theory. This
is the position taken by the American Law Institute in its Restatement of the Law of Torts. Here the old maxim is recognized as to ownership of airspace above the land, and every
unauthorized entry thereon is held to be a trespass, but such
trespass is privileged until actual damage is suffered by the
landowner or until the trespass becomes a nuisance. 4 This has
also been called the easement theory 5 on the ground that the
public acquires an easement in the airspace.
.
The theory has been criticized and recent decisions seem
to indicate that those criticisms have not been unfounded. In
1935, Leon Green felt that the question should not be said to
be one of privilege, but rather of right; 6 that the restatement
theory tel quel put the whole burden on the aviator when a
better result would be reached by a more equal balancing of the
burden between such aviator and the landowner below. This
eminent writer casts out the old maxim as entirely unsatisfactory today.
And in the leading case of Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, decided in 1936, the federal court seems to have accomplished the same result. The facts of the case were not complicated. Plaintiff owned land adjacent to an airport and
alleged numerous and repeated fights over his land ranging in
height from five to one hundred and seventy-five feet above the
surface. But he showed no actual damage. The court held
that flying above the surface of land is not a trespass, but is
'Salmond on Torts (7th Edition, p. 238).
'Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp. (1932), 55 Fed. 2nd 201.
'Torts Restatement, Sees. 158, 159, 194.
"35 Michigan Law Review I 123.
"Journal of Air Law 6: 201-205.
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lawful unless it results in injury to the owner in the use of his
land. The result here is the same as that reached by application of the restatement theory, but the method is, of course,
far more direct. The court slashed through the red tape of old
rules and new theories and laid down its rule of law. Its doing
so7 was approved by Mr. Green in an article in the Illinois Law
Review. 8 It is to be noted that with this case the burden is
taken from the aviator and thrown entirely on the landowner.
He may have no recovery until he can prove actual damage. ·
The court didn't stop here, however, but went on to hold
that· airspace is not the subject of ownership except as the
owner of the surface below may so subject it as an incident of
his use of the surface, and until that time it is open to navigation by aircraft. This is not a tendency to the zone of expected
use theory, for here is no allowance of air to the landowner for
what he may reasonably expect to use, but rather a flat denial
as to him until he actually uses that amount of air above him,
or uses it as an incident to his use below. Actual use instead
of a reasonable expectancy is the test here.
The case presents a federal court in contradiction with
the restatement theory, which court is evolving rules for aviation alone. The last word, of course, is for the Supreme
Court and until it has spoken all roads are open.
The Hinman case pales, however, when one considers the
case of Tucker v. United Air Lines and City of Iowa City; 9
from the District Court of .Iowa in 19 3 5. Here a suit by the
city against Tucker and a suit by Tucker against the airline
were consolidated for a single determination. Tucker owned
land adjacent to the airport and sought to enjoin the company
from flying planes at such low altitude as to interfere with the
reasonable enjoyment of his property and with trees he had
planted along his boundary line. The court enjoined the company from flying at an altitude lower than thirty feet. But it
also enjoined Tucker from planting trees higher than twentyfive feet on his boundary line as being an improper and unnecessary use of his property.
This holding leaves one aghast. To follow it to its logical conclusion would mean that a landowner may use his prop'84 Fed. 2nd 755, Review 499 (1937).
8
31 Illinois Law Review 499 ( 193 7).
•supp. 1935 U.S. Aviation Reports I.
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erty only in such a way as not to interfere with the flight of
aircraft above. If he builds a house one inch in from his
boundary line he may be enjoined from building a two-story
house and commanded to build only a one-story house. If he
desires to improve his land he may not have a tree higher than
twenty-five feet, an absurdly small tree. And this is an "improper and unnecessary use of property"! The positions are
reversed. The landowner has the privilege and the aviator the
right-the right not to be interfered with in his flight.
Here is a taking of property without due process; here is
a taking of private property for private use without compensation; here is an impairment of vested rights; here is a denial
of equal protection of the laws; here, finally, is a contradiction
of the very spirit of the federal Constitution.
The holding is not one of a court of last resort, and that
seems to be its only saving grace. The case has been commented upon very briefly in Columbia Law Review10 but not
elsewhere to the writer's knowledge.
The tendency then seems to be away from the privilege
theory to a theory of right. And Colorado seems in line with
this tendency.
In 193 7, Colorado passed its first important Aeronautics
Act. Previous statutes had dealt principally with the creation
of a commission, its duties and powers. 11 The recent act repealed these statutes for the most part, 12 and set up new machinery for the handling of the problem. It also made certain
pronouncements interesting in the present discussion. The
act was entitled:
"AN ACT
providing for the regulation of aeronautics within this state; providing
for uniformity with the federal laws regulating aeronautics creating a
state aeronautic commission; providing the powers and- duties of such
commission; providing for promulgation and issuance of rules and regulations by such commission."

It went on to provide that the sovereignty in space above
the lands and waters of the state rested in the state, except
10
36 Columbia Law
Law; correction on fact,
"35 C. S. A. Chap.
12
'37 Session Laws,

Review 483-484; facts and decree also reported. 6 Journal Air
7 Journal Air Law, 293, 622.
17.
Chap. 8L Sec. 14.
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where assumed by United States law. 13 It then provided that
· 'Ow.nership of space above lands and waters of this state is dedared to be vested in the severaJ·owners of the surface beneath, subject
to the right of fight described in Section 8 hereof. " 14
·
"Flight in aircraft over the lands and waters of this state is lawful.
unless at such low altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to
which the land or water is put by the owner, or unless so conducted as to
.be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or
water, or in violation of the air commerce regulations which have been,
or may hereafter be, promulgated by the Department of Commerce of
the United States. The landing of an aircraft on the lands or waters of
another, without his consent, is unlawful. except in case of forced landing. For damages caused by a forced landing, however, the owner or
lessee of the aircraft or the airman 'shall be liable for actual damage
caused by sucp forced landing." 15

These sections are similar to Sections 2, 3, 4 and 11 of
the Uniform Aeronautics Act adopted in twenty-one states
and Hawaii.
Colorado then concedes the ownership of the airspace
above the land to be in the owner of the land. But such ownership is subject to ·a "right of flight." The privilege theory
is discarded and the theory of a right is enunciated. Such flight
is not a privileged trespass, but is lawful. Here, as in the Hinman case, is a denial of the red tape of the restatement. Such
flight is lawful unless at such low altitude as to interfere with
the then existing use to which the land or water is put by the
owner. The words "then existing use" are important-for
here is a rejection of the zone of expected use theory and the
test is that of actual use. Again the statute enacts the holding
of the Hinman case.
The statute goes on, "or unless so conducted as to be imminently dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the
land or water"-and this, fortunately, would seem to be in
contradiction to the holding in the Tucker case, for trees
would certainly be lawfully on the land.
It provides for damages in case of a forced landing only
when actual damage is done, and would seem to put the
burden on the landowner to show such damage.
The Colorado statute is a progressive one and seems to
enact those rules most highly favored by the courts at the present day. It does something more than mere lip service to the
'"Ibid, Chap 81. Sec. 6.
"Ibid, Sec. 7.
"Ibid, Sec. 8.
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old maxim in that it seems to provide that when the landowner actually puts the airspace above him to use, he is the
actual and undisputed owner of that amount of space. Thus
it would seem that, if the zoning laws did not interfere, a landowner could for purposes erect an Eiffel Tower or an Empire
State Building on his land without infringement on the aircraft's right of flight, which is conditioned on the nonuser of
the airspace by the landowner.
The statute has not yet been construed by the Colorado
court. It is to be noted that the Colorado statute, as well as
statutes in other states, leaves the actual regulation of aeronautics to federal authorities, and it is perhaps possible that the
whole field will one day be subject to federal authority alone.
This is the solution proposed by writers who disclaim all of
the theories mentioned above and would hold the airspace to
be a channel of commerce, analogous to navigable waters. The
public would then have a natural easement in the airspace and
if anyone would suffer it would be the landowner. ·
Signor da Pistoia' s maxim, then, has not been cast off in
its entirety. Something of its spirit remains in modern law.
But it has been remodeled, as have the ancient palazzos of his
own Italy, to conform to modern needs-with electric lights
and a landing field.
JUST A HACKNEYED EXPRESSION
On May 31, 1935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, speaking at
Washington of the action of the United States Supreme Court in holding
N. R. A. unconstitutional. publicly declared that we were no longer
living in the "horse and buggy days." This striking way of stating a
great truth thereafter achieved great popularity, partly because it was
felt to be of most recent origin.
Patient research, however, has brought to light the fact that it was
eight years earlier and in Colorado that this cogent phrase and the idea
which it expressed were in our times first put to official use. On April
18, 1927, our own Judge John T. Adams, then o.ne of the members
of the Colorado Supreme Court, said, in the case of Colby v. Board, 81
Colo. 344, 353: "Even so we do not apprehend that we are now offending the rule of stare decisis as applied to any of our previous decisions.
We are only applying old principles to new conditions or to the changed
facts of modern life. Thus, a horse and buggy day decision in the livery
stable case, Phillips v. City of Denver, 19 Colo. 179, intimately allied
with those times, would be incongruous now if not considered in the
light of moder.n industrial and civic development."
BENTLEY M. MCMULLIN, of the Denver Bar.

THE LAW'S DELAY
By WILLIAM B. KING, of the Denver Bar

In the address of Judge Phillips before the Denver Bar
Association, printed in January DICTA, attention is called to
a provision of the original Federal Judiciary Act whereunder
writs of error might be brought at any time within five years
from the rendering of judgment. The existence of such a
provision gives rise to the suspicion that in former times there
may occasionally have been some slight lack of celerity in the
progress of litigation.
The most protracted legal controversy of which this
writer has encountered an authentic record lasted forty-eight
years. It began right after the Civil War, and ended after the
beginning of the World War. It originally bore the quaint,
if meaningful. appellation: "United States against Fifty Barrels of Whiskey." The defendant was lawfully at large on
bail for nearly forty years, receiving intermittent judicial consideration from the United States District Court in Louisiana,
the old Circuit Court, and the Supreme Court. As an encore,
the subject matter (I mean the controversy, not the defendant
in propria persona) came before the Circuit Court of Appeals
(created twenty- four years after the casus belli arose) and before the Supreme Court a second time.
The genesis of this unseemly strife between two uneven! y
matched antagonists, above named, was the commencement by
the United States of a forfeiture proceeding in rem in the
United States District Court in 1867. One Gaspard .Theurer
came to defendant's aid and procured its release into his cherishing custody by giving a bond therefor. Subsequent chronology is:
·
April 4, 1868. Trial in District Court; judgment of
condemnation and forfeiture.
Apri/9, 1868. The defendant was saved by the loyalty
of its bondsman, who took an appeal to the Circuit Court.
May 2, 18 7 0. Appeal dismissed by the Circuit Court.
May 18, 18 70. Although Gaspard Theurer's sympathy
for the res defendant had spiritualized sometime since, its fair
character was still not without a champion, and the case ascended to the Supreme Court on a writ of error. There it
131
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slumbered for thirty-five years, apparently ·at peace with the
world, the suitors and the respective counsel. There is no record as to the behavior of the res defendant during this period,
or whether it violated its recognizance by departing the jurisdiction. It must have become in some way opprobrious, for.
nobody took the trouble to docket the case.
December 4, 1905. Writ of error dismissed by the Supreme Court. 199 U.S. 615.
February 3, 1906. Mandate entered in the District
Court, "when, and when only," according to judicial pronouncement, "the original judgment became final and executory." This devoutly to be wished for consummation having
been achieved at long last, the judgment of condemnation
apparently was not executed-whether out of respect for the
age of the res defendant does not appear. After a mature consideration of some five years, the government seemingly elected
to proceed in personam.
·
August 5, 1911. Ancillary suit brought by the United
States to enforce the judgment "against the heirs of his (Gaspard Theurer's) heirs and their heirs, even to the fourth generation." The language is that of the trial judge. Judgment
for defendants.
April 9, · 1914. Judgment affirmed by the Circuit Court
of Appeals. 213 Fed. 964. A dissenting opinion held that
the case ought to be remanded for further proceedings.
January 11, 19 15. Further proceedings obviated by denial of petition for certiorari. 235 U. S. 706. The Supreme
Court no doubt felt that due deliberation had been accorded
the controversy, and that no unseemly haste had prejudiced
the substantial rights of any of the litigants.
Query: Who got the whiskey?
DENVER DIVORCE RECORDS
Possibly a few sour notes or the "rift in the lute" was responsible.
for the divorce action of Piccolo vs. Piccolo. It looks as though John
was too much of an ambler and Henry was a confirmed joker, resulting
in Ambler vs. Ambler and Wagster vs. Wagster, and we'll have to look
into this one, because hubby didn't ask for a divorce from wifie when
the case of Hubby vs. Hubby was filed.
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STRUCTURE OF THE COLORADO JUNIOR BAR
CONFERENCE
By HUGH D. HENRY, Secretary- Treasurer*

T

HE purpose of this article is to give in compact, readabl-e
form the By-laws of the Colorado Junior Bar Conference
which were ratified at the meeting in Colorado Springs
on September 10, 1938.
Membership: All members of the American Bar Association under the age of thirty-six years are members of its
Junior Bar Conference and all members of the Junior Bar
Conference located in Colorado are members of the Colorado
Junior Bar Conference. Membership in the Junior Bar Conference terminates at the close of the annual meeting of the
American Bar Association following the member's thirtysixth birtpday.
Affiliation: The Colorado Junior Bar Conference is a
state unit of the Junior Bar Conference of the American Bar
Association.
•This is the second of the series of articles on the organization and program of the
Colorado Junior Bar Conference.

133

134

DICTA

Purpose: The purpose of the Colorado Junior Bar Conference is to cooperate with and assist in the accomplishment
of the programs of the American Bar Association and its Junior Bar Conference and the Colorado Bar Association, and
assist and give attention to those problems peculiarly affecting
the professional careers of the younger lawyers of Colorado.
Meetings: The annual meeting is held at the same time
and place as the annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association. In addition, two regional meetings will be scheduled
yearly.
Council: The Council consists of one member from each
judicial district in Colorado elected by the members of the respective districts present at the annual meeting. The chairman, vice-chairman, secretary-treasurer, and last retiring chairman are members of the Council. The Council forms the policy of the Conference and advises the chairman; it approves
the appointments of the chairman and the filling of the vacancies by him by two-third vote. It meets twice a year and special meetings may be called by the chairman or by two-thirds
of the members.
Officers: The chairman is appointed by the chairman
of the Junior Bar Conference of the American Bar Association
after recommendation of the retiring Council. The vicechairman and secretary-treasurer are elected by the members in
attendance at the annual meeting. The Council acts as a nominating committee for these two offices and nominations may
also be made from the floor. Neither the chairman, vice-chairman nor secretary-treasurer may be elected for two successive
terms.
Committees: All standing committees and all special
committees created by the chairman or by the recommendation
of the Council are appointed by the chairman upon approval
of two-thirds of the Council. The standing committees are as
follows:
Membership
American Citizenship
Judicial Selection
Public Information and Speaking
Legal Ethics and Unauthorized Practice of Law
Meetings and Arrangements
Procedural Improvement and Proper Legislation
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Grievances
Program Suggestions
To Sponsor Newly Admitted Members of the Bar
Bar Examinations
Standards of Admission to the Bar
Committee members do not hold office beyond the term
of the chairman appointing them, and any committee member
may be removed by the chairman with or without cause.
Amendment: The By-laws may be amended by a twothirds vote of the members voting at any regular annual meeting, provided that a notice that such amendment will be voted
upon, signed by at least ten members, must be filed with the
secretary at least two weeks prior to the meeting, or the unanimous consent of the membership present at the annual meeting
must be obtained.

LEGAL INSTITUTES AID TO REVITALIZE BAR

H

AILED as evidencing a revitalized interest in bar association activities, legal institutes in Colorado have become a definite part of bar association work as the
result of three highly successful meetings. The seventh and
ninth judicial districts will hold a legal institute in Grand
Junction on April 15. Mortimer Stone and Max Melville
will be the speakers. A fifth institute will be held in Colorado
Springs on Saturday, April 22, when Wilbur Denious, Edward L. Wood, and Golding Fairfield are scheduled to speak.
Plans are being discussed relative to the formulation of a series
of institutes to be held in Denver this summer.
Following the meeting at Greeley on February 4, the
Arkansas Valley lawyers, with approximately 115 in attendance, held an institute at Pueblo on March 10. It was the first
gathering of lawyers, other than for local bar association functions, in Pueblo in the history of the state.
Laurence E. Langdon, president of the Pueblo County
Bar Association, who presided at the institute, declared:
"Never in my memory have so many lawyers, from cities other
than Pueblo, attended any function sponsored by lawyers
here. It is the first time Pueblo has had the honor of being the
host of any meeting held under· the auspices of the Colorado
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Bar Association. We all hail these institutes as a welcomed
sign of a revitalized interest in bar association activities."
The afternoon session was turned over to William R.
Kelly, chairman of the Colorado Bar Association Committee
on Legal Institutes. He introduced Albert J. Gould of Denver, who discussed in a very able and entertaining manner tax
problems of interest to lawyers. After dinner in the Congress
Hotel, Mr. Kelly, as toastmaster, introduced the various members of the bench and bar present.
Judge Otto Bock of the Supreme Court spoke briefly on
the topic of "Making Justice Easier to Get." . Judge Bock
stated that the legal institutes showed that the profession was
interested in simplifying procedure and that other signs indicated that lawyers and law teachers were attempting to bring
about reforms in legal methods. The federal rules of procedure were founded on the basic principle that justice should
be easier to get. Research work in universities is being conducted to attempt solution of present problems confronting
legal procedure. At the present time, in the opinion of Judge
Bock, what is most needed is a strong and cohesive union of
lawyers which can use its influence to ensure necessary -~eforms.
The main speaker of the evening was G. Dexter Blount,
president of the Colorado Bar Association, substituting for
Charles O'Conner of Boulder, who was prevented by illness
from attending. Mr. Blount related the history of the legal
institutes, and outlined the future program for their development. "There is little doubt but that the legal institutes have
rejuvenated the bar," he said.
The evening session of the institute was devoted to a discussion of unlawful practice by Max Melville of Denver.
Tracing the development of the prerogative of the courts from
early English history, Mr. Melville discussed the attitude of
the Colorado courts on the question. He stressed the point
that the Colorado courts had not seen fit to follow the weight
of the authority on many of the propositions involved and
suggested that lawyers actively interest themselves in the problems.
Following the Pueblo meeting, the San Luis Valley Bar
Association held an institute at Alamosa on March 13. Leonard Haynie of Alamosa, as president of the association, pre:-
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sided. The afternoon session was devoted to a fine exposition
of chattel mortgages by Louis Hellerstein of Denver. Lawyers
present evinced a great interest in the talk and especially as the
discussion related to liens created by the sales and service tax
acts.
After dinner George H. Blickhahn of Alamosa presented
his delightful fantasy of the Italian immigrant at a baseball
game. Burris Goudy of Monte Vista contributed to the merriment with a few witty remarks. A short outline of the activities of the state bar association· and its present organization
was given by Fred Y. Holland, its secretary.
The evening session of the institute was devoted to a
brilliant discussion of criminal law and its attendant problems
by Kenneth Robinson of Denver. Thus closed the third institute to be held in this state.
A large share of credit for the success of the Pueblo institute should belong to Harry Petersen, J. W. Preston, Tom
Marsalis, and H. P. Vories, who, as members of the local committee, carried out the details of the institute. The Alamosa
meeting was planned by W. W. Platt and Raphael J. Moses.
Stewart Shafer of Cortez came the furthest distance to
attend the Pueblo meeting. David Sarvas of Brighton claimed
the second prize for distance travelled. The long distance
award was made to Lou D. Mowry of Denver for the Alamosa
institute. While Messrs. Robinson, Holland, and Hellerstein
also attended from Denver, they were disqualified as being on
the program.
Raphael J. Moses of Alamosa disputes all title claims
springing from the institutes. "I think I still hold a record,"
he writes, "in view of the fact that I am the only person who
has attended all three institutes." Ray reports that in addition to "all of the able-bodied practicing lawyers in the district," the clerk of the County Court in Rio Grande County,
the court reporter for the district, and "one lone banker attended the institute. Perhaps all of the bankers should have
been present 'for the afternoon session, as they draw 90% of
the chattel mortgages in this district." Page Mr. Mel ville!
Wyoming, we understand, is planning a series of legal
institutes, the first of which is to be held in Cheyenne.
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Junior Bar Conference Holds Regional Meeting
The second regional conference of the Junior Bar Conference occurred in Pueblo on March 10. Twenty-seven
young lawyers were present at the meeting which was held in
the Navajo Room of the Bluebird Cafe.
Mark Harrington, president of the Conference, outlined
the origin and purposes of the Conference. He was followed
by chairmen of the various committees who were present. H.
Shields Mason of Denver, chairman of the membership committee; Hugh D. Henry of Denver, secretary of the Conference; Leo S. Altman of Pueblo, councilman for the district,
and Wm. Hedges Robinson, Jr., of Denver, public relations
director, all spoke briefly on the purposes and program of their
departments.
Reception to the program as outlined was highly enthusiastic, and members present began an immediate campaign to
increase membership in the Conference throughout the state.
Lawyers from nearly a dozen towns were at the meeting.
A regional gathering will be attempted on the Western
Slope early this summer, according to present plans. The
second annual meeting of the Conference is scheduled in conjunction with the state bar meeting.
·
Because he was recuperating from a recent illness, which
had confined him to the hospital, J. T. Thomas of Antonito
was not present at the Alamosa meeting. He was the only
member of the bar from that city who did not attend.
Jesse E. Pound, our local correspondent in Alamosa,
writes that the opinion was unanimous that the "Alamosa
Institute was a real success and should be repeated again before
other local associations. Another institute in the valley will
be well attended; there is no doubt of that."

Regional Correspondents
With this issue, the Colorado Bar Association Section of
DICTA inaugurates a plan of regional correspondents. A cor. respondent has been selected in each district, whose duty it will
be to send in items of interest to the legal profession so that it
may appear in these pages.
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The correspondents who have accepted this duty are
GeorgeS. Cosand of La Junta, Charles J. Simon of Colorado
Springs, Charles Corlett of Monte Vista; Jesse E. Pound of
Alamosa, Judge J. Edgar Chenoweth of Trinidad, John W.
O'Hagan of Greeley, C. H. Darrow of Glenwood Springs,
Stewart Shafter of Cortez, Charles J. Ribar of Pueblo, R.
Franklin McKelvey of Durango, George F. Dodge, Jr., of
Montrose, and Dale E. Shannon of Fort Collins. Other correspondents for the remaining regions will be announced shortly.
Lawyers having news items of general interest to the profession are urged to send it to their local correspondents or to
Wm. Hedges Robinson, Jr., 410 Midland Savings Bank
Building, Denver. Any suggestions for improvement or material for these pages will be appreciated.
The Broadmoor Hotel will be the scene of the institute
to be held in Colorado Springs on April 22, according to tentative plans formulated by Leon H. Snyder, chairman of the
committee in charge. Mr. Golding Fairfield of Denver will
speak on "Developments in Real Estate Law of Interest to
Practicing Lawyers," and Edward L. Wood will have for his
subject "Automobile Liability." Wilbur Denious is also
scheduled on the program.
·
Law Day at University of Colorado
The University of Colorado Law School has set April
29, 1939, for its annual Law Day. Prof. Ralph Aigler, of
the University of Michigan, will be the principal speaker.
His topic will be, "The Law of Banks and Their Customers."
The program will commence at 10:00 o'clock in the
morning and will include a 1uncheon and dinner ineeting. The
morning session will be held in the law school at Boulder, and
the luncheon and dinner meeting will take place in the Student
Memorial Building, according to present plans.
Invitations to all lawyers within the state will be mailed
from Boulder within a few days, according to Dean Robert L.
Stearns.
Legal Institute will be held at Grand Junction on April
15, 1939. Mr. Mortimer Stone of Ft. Collins will speak on
"Contracts for Sale of Real Estate" and Mr. Max Melville of
Denver will speak on "Unlawful Practice of Law."

Supreme Court Decisions
JUVENILE COURT-DEPENDENCY-EVIDENCE-PETITION-AMEND.MENT-Davis vs. People, etc.-No. 14482-Decided January 16,
19 39--Juvenile Court of Denver-Hon. Eugene Madden, Jr.,
Judge.
HELD: 1. Evidence examined and found to be sufficient and upon
which jury could base verdict of paternity of child.
2. The petition for dependency filed in Juvenile Court before
birth of child was properly amended at time of hearing to show birth of
child in interim.
3. Where the paternity of the child has been established beyond
question, the law should be liberally construed to insure the necessary
help to the child and mother, consonant with the father's ability to pay.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Burke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION--ELECTION-Stahura v. Industrial Commission-No. 14465-Decided January 23, 1939-District Court
. of Denver-Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Where coal miner suffers injury to leg, and doctors
contend it should be amputated at knee, but claimant refuses to submit
to operation, and receives and accepts statutory compensation on basis
that leg was removed, he may not later claim additional compensation
on the basis of permanent partial disability, for if his disability is greater
than it would have been with amputation, it is the result of his own
election.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Burke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
CRIMINAL LAW- INTOXICATION- DRIVING AUTOMOBILE- EVIDENCEv-CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES-Bauer v. People-No.
14400-Decided January 23, 1939-District Court of Logan
County-Han. Arlington Taylor, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Defendant found guilty of driving an automobile while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, having previously been convicted of a similar offense.
HELD: 1. "To prove that a person was intoxicated it is not
necessary to prove the process, often a secret one, by which he got intoxicated."
2. "The state of intoxication is a condition as to the existence of
which even a lay witness may express his opinio.n."
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3. It was not error for the trial court to admit evidence of previous police court convictions of drunkenness and of driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, where the record shows it was admitted for purposes of impeachment. This is particularly so where the
testimony of the defendant on direct examination opens the door for such
evidence.
4. The Supreme Court has no right to interfere with the determination of the facts by the jury, which were charged with the duty of·
determining the credibility of the . witnesses and the weight of their
testimony.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bock concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

WILLS-ELECTION OF SURVIVING SPOUSE-FILING ELECTION BEFORE PROBATE-In re: Estate of Stitzer. Peterson, etc. v. Stitzer
-No. 14481-Decided January 30, 1939-District Court of
Denver-Ron. Henry S. Lindsley, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. An efection of a surviving spouse, not to take under
the will of decedent, containing a provision reserving right to continue
to contest probate of will, is valid although will is eventually admitted
to probate and election is filed prior thereto~
2. Any written form of notice which accomplishes the purpose
of informing those charged with the administration of the estate that the
surviving spouse is dissatisfied with the will and is asserting statutory
rights, is sufficient to constitute an election.
3. Form of election examined and found .not to be' ambiguous
as to intention of surviving spouse.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous; EN BANC.
VENUE-REPLEVIN-EVIDENCE--Johnson Oil.. Inc. v. Rogers, eta!.
-No. 14401-Decided January 30, 1939-District Court of
Otero County-Hon. William B. Stewart, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. Court did not err in granting change of venue upon
application therefor, in replevin suit to county where the subject matter
(property) of the action was located. (1935 C. S. A. vol. 1. p. 36,
sec. 26.)
2. Evidence examined and found to center around conflicting
testimony as to oral agreement. Trial court's decision as to existence of
such agreeme.nt wili not be disturbed.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Burke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
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